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The spread of the COVID-19 pandemic has emphasized the role of governments in a public 
health emergency not only in developing countries, but in the developed world as well. This 
paper has a two-fold objective. First, we investigate the efficiency of COVID management 
using state-level data from three of the worst affected countries, USA, India, and Mexico, in 
three time periods in the pre-vaccine phase. Next, we explore the extent to which state 
government financial, sociodemographic, and governance indicators can explain the difference 
in efficiency. We use a two-stage non-parametric method. The first stage comprises of meta 
frontier analysis to derive efficiency scores for each state. We analyze state governments in 
these countries together (grand frontier) and separately (group frontier). Overall, grand 
efficiency continuously increased from August to November 2020. The grand efficiency scores 
of Mexico and the USA gradually increased on 3rd October and 29th November 2020. The 
results reflect that the USA was holding the leading position in terms of COVID-19 pandemic 
management at that time. In terms of group efficiency, American states performed consistently 
well with respect to their own country as well as other countries. However, if we compare the 
grand and group efficiency scores of all three countries, we find that states in India and Mexico 
performed well in their own countries but worse than USA states in terms of the global scenario. 
The states of India always performed better within their own country than the states of the other 
two countries. The second analytical stage uses an exploratory median analysis to investigate 
the impact of different indicators on efficiency. State finance variables are positively associated 
with the grand efficiency score for all three time periods, while the association is negative for 
the expenditures to own revenue ratio and expenditures to total revenue ratios, debt ratios with 
respect to different fiscal indicators, and percentage of health expenditure over total 
expenditures and GSDP. These patterns are less consistent among countries when we look at 
group efficiency over time. We find a positive association of per capita total revenue with group 
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1. Introduction and Literature 
The COVID-19 pandemic has been different to any other disaster the world has 
experienced in the last century. COVID-19 has spread in 214 countries and territories within a 
few months, making it one of the worst pandemics in history. During the pandemic, all levels of 
world governments have operated under extreme uncertainty and strong measures of lockdowns 
and containments have been taken in almost all countries. Despite all the efforts towards 
prevention and control, as of March 29, 2021 around 127 million cases have been confirmed and 
it has claimed the lives of approximately 2.79 million people. Although conventional disaster 
relief tools have been rendered inadequate due to the vast, universal, and unpredictable spread of 
the pandemic, it is incontrovertible that government bodies still play a significant role in 
managing the disaster.  
In a multi-tier government set up, each tier (central, state, and local) plays a significant 
role in managing disasters and emergencies in all countries across the globe. Carter (2008) 
categorizes disaster management systems into three parts: preparedness, response, and recovery, 
and recognizes that the system utilizes the total extent and depth of an existing government 
structure of a country including central, state (or equivalent), and local (county/city/village/etc.) 
government bodies. Since the government structure is pre-defined and relatively permanent in a 
country, it is utilized as the backbone of disaster management preparedness and activities. 
However, the roles of different tiers of governments may vary across countries.1  
 
1 According to Col (2007), in the United States, state and local governments are generally responsible for all phases of disaster 
management with assistance from the federal government agencies like FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). In India, 
the disaster management structure underwent a paradigm shift in 2005, after the Disaster Management Act (2005) was passed. The 
Act creates national, state, and district level disaster management authorities who play proactive roles in prevention, mitigation, and 
preparedness-driven approaches to minimize the loss of human lives, livelihoods, and economic properties in case of natural disasters 
(Singh, Pandey, and Mina, 2019). The federal government in Mexico has created different kinds of catastrophe bonds and natural 
disaster funds (Fonden) to deal with natural disasters (Buhler, 2018). According to the Law on Federal Public Administration and the 
General Law on National Property in Mexico, every government institution must have insurance against natural disasters to protect 
its property and infrastructure. In addition, beginning in 2017, all 31 states and Mexico City are mandated to create their own reserves 






Central governments have generally committed to provide substantial aids to mitigate the 
devastating health and socioeconomic impact of the pandemic. If we go through the primary 
measures taken by the central governments in some of the worst affected countries viz. USA, 
India, and Mexico, we find that the federal government in the USA has passed several acts to 
fight the direct and socioeconomic effects of the COVID-19 crisis.2 An estimated US$2.3 trillion 
(around 11% of GDP) Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economy Security Act (“CARES Act”) was 
passed in March 2020, along with a $483 billion Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care 
Enhancement Act, a $8.3 billion Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, and a US$192 billion Families First Coronavirus Response Act. The acts 
include expenditures for virus testing; transfers to states for Medicaid funding; funds for 
development of vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics; support for the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC)’s responses; and grants for hospitals as a direct measure to fight 
the COVID-19 pandemic. To mitigate socioeconomic disaster due to the pandemic, the acts also 
include one-time tax rebates to individuals; expansion of unemployment benefits; prevention of 
corporate bankruptcy by providing loans; forgiveness of Small Business Administration loans 
and guarantees to help small businesses that retain workers; transfers to state and local 
governments; and international assistance. 
India’s fiscal support measures can be divided into two broad categories: (i) direct 
spending (about 1.7 percent of GDP, approximately $50 billion)3; and (ii) below-the-line 
measures designed to support businesses and increase credit provision to several sectors (about 
 
2 The central government intervention data for all three countries has been used until November 2020. A more 
updated account can be found at Covid 19 Policy Response article by IMF (https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-
covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#I) 
3 All calculations for Mexico and India are done using 2019 GDP data for the respective countries and rupee to 






4.9 percent of GDP, approximately $140 billion). The key direct-spending measures are the 
transfer of cash and in-kind (food; cooking gas) support to lower-income households, insurance 
coverage for workers in the healthcare sector, and wage support and employment provision to 
low-wage workers. An additional $2.04 billion (about 0.1 percent of GDP) will be allocated to 
healthcare infrastructure. Moreover, several measures have also been announced to ease the tax 
compliance burden. Apart from this, a public charitable trust under the name of ‘Prime Minister’s 
Citizen Assistance and Relief in Emergency Situations Fund’ (PM CARES Fund) has been set up 
to deal with any kind of emergency.  
Fiscal policy to fight the COVID-19 pandemic in Mexico has had a four-fold agenda: (i) 
ensuring sufficient financial resources to Ministry of health; (ii) supporting households and firms 
through the pandemic by providing housing credits and personal loans (approximately $1.9 
billion, 0.15 percent of GDP) at a lower interest rate, and a deferral program of monthly 
payments (approximately $25.1 million, 0.002 percent of GDP); (iii) boosting credit and 
strengthening liquidity and health of financial markets by lending to firms and workers in both 
formal and informal sectors, and injecting liquidity through development banks (approximately 
$3.23 billion, 0.25 percent of GDP); and (iv) acceleration of tender processes for public 
expenditure. Additionally, further resources have been allocated to increase social spending 
related to infrastructure, security, education, and other areas (approximately, $2.5 billion, 0.2 
percent of GDP). 
Even a highly active central government cannot handle a crisis of this proportion alone. 
Recognizing the role of subnational governments in disaster management, which is 
acknowledged if not well-researched by scholars in disaster management literature, we identify 





literature is scant and sporadic in this area. Bandyopadhyay and Roy Chowdhury (2020) find that 
fiscal health has a positive role to play in managing the COVID-19 pandemic using state-level 
data of fatality and recovery in India for March 2020. According to Dupré et al. (2020), there 
have been highly differentiated impacts of COVID-19 on subnational finance in different 
countries and the main determinants of such varying effects are the degree of decentralization, 
sensitivity towards economic fluctuations, fiscal flexibility to adjust revenues and expenditures, 
fiscal health, and the efficiency and scope of support from higher levels of government. Nemec 
and Špaček (2020) look at the problem from a different angle. They explore the impact of 
COVID-19 on intergovernmental relations and local government finance in Czechia and 
Slovakia. They find that the fiscal imbalances in those two countries at the municipal level are 
not proportional to the situation at the central government and that local government finances 
may face issues with service delivery due to inadequate response to COVID-19 from the central 
government. Dutta and Fischer (2020) argue that governance has a substantial role to play in the 
trajectory of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
So far, there has not been any study, theoretical or empirical, exploring the role of state 
finances and other indicators to both act as catalysts in implementing central government 
measures and add new dimensions to drive the success of COVID-19 crisis management. 
Granted, our work is closest to Bandyopadhyay and Roy Chowdhury (2020) and has certain 
overlaps with Dupré et al. (2020). We also investigate the governance angle of the story, a 
context similar to Dutta and Fischer (2020). To the best of our knowledge, however, this is the 
first attempt to address the state fiscal element of these issues in a structured, rigorous, empirical 
framework. In this paper, we explore the role of state finance and attempt to establish its 





pre-vaccine stage. We choose three countries: the USA, India, and Mexico, which are amongst 
the worst affected countries by the pandemic.  
We intend to address several research questions related to the efficiencies of COVID-19 
management across countries, questions that can be laid out in two layers. The first layer deals 
with country-specific and overall efficiencies and their behavior across time: How can we assess 
the efficiency of performance in COVID-19 management? How do these efficiencies vary across 
countries? Are the countries becoming more efficient with experience? The second layer of 
questions delves deeper into establishing the role of state-level indicators in explaining the 
performances, overall, within each country and in inter-country comparisons: What are the 
important determinants of these efficiencies? Can state indicators explain efficiencies in COVID 
management in a country? In state indicators, we include mostly indicators related to state 
finances; sociodemographic and governance indicators are also considered. The study is based on 
data on the three highly-affected countries mentioned above. Although early cases in all three 
countries were confirmed in late January or early February, the true outbreak started in March in 
the USA and in June in both India and Mexico. We consider deaths and recoveries after a few 
months in the pandemic.4 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology with the data and 
variables; Section 3 spells out the results; and Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. Methodology, Data and Variables 
 
We use a two-stage method to address our research questions as laid out in the two layers 
described above. In the first stage, we derive the efficiency scores for the COVID management 
 
4 We use data for all three countries between August to November. All three countries suffered a substantial number 





for each country as a whole and at the state level. We envisage COVID-19 management as a 
simple production process, with ‘inputs’ like doctors, paramedics, and hospital beds leading to 
recoveries or deaths, which are treated as the ‘outputs’ of the process. We attempt a meta frontier 
analysis using subnational level data on these inputs and outputs. We derive the efficiency scores 
for each country as a whole and for each state of a country. This way, we can compare 
efficiencies in COVID-19 management across the states within a country and across countries. 
We also compare the score of a state in its ‘group’ (that is, relative to the other states in the 
country it is located) and with the states of all analyzed countries together. This yields insights 
into the performance of a particular state in its own country vis a vis those of all other included 
countries taken together. 
In the second stage, we study the role of state indicators in explaining differences in 
efficiency in COVID-19 management. Amongst state indicators, we are particularly interested in 
finding whether state finances can play an active role in COVID-19 management. We also 
include some sociodemographic, development, and governance indicators at the state level to 
understand these factors’ roles. 
Stage 1: Nonparametric DEA 
The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique first evolved from the school of 
mathematical programming. The famous economist Koopmans (1951) recognized the connection 
between the problem of the existence of non-negative prices and quantities in a Walras-Cassel 
economy and the mathematical programming problem of optimizing an objective function 
subject to a set of linear inequality constraints. He defined a point in the commodity space as 
efficient whenever an increase in the net output of one good required a decrease in that of some 
other good. In view of its obvious similarity with the notion of Pareto optimality, this definition 





Debreu (1951) introduced the concept of the coefficient of resource utilization as a measure of 
TE for the economy as a whole (from the point of view of the cost of resources) and interpreted 
any deviation of this measure from unity as a deadweight loss for the society on account of the 
inefficient utilization of resources. The measures of efficiency developed by Farrell (1957) 
expressed a close link with the notion (in axiomatic production theory) of radial contraction of 
inputs/expansion of outputs from an observed point to the frontier, i.e., the efficiency of a firm 
reflects its ability to use the inputs in optimal proportion, given their respective prices, or to 
achieve the maximum level of output attainable by the state of technology. In his pioneering 
1957 work, Farrell assumed constant returns to scale (CRS) of technology in production. 
Hoffman (1957) pointed out that the dual simplex method, an algorithm to solve a linear 
programming (LP) problem, could be applied to obtain Farrell’s measure of efficiency. This 
turned out to be an important pragmatic suggestion and was adopted by Farrell himself in his 
later work with Fieldhouse (1962), where the case of increasing returns to scale was also 
incorporated. After that, in DEA literature Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) contributed their 
crucial work, known as the CCR model. Their model can convert fractional programming into a 
linear programming by selecting suitable weights (which is nothing but the virtual prices of 
inputs and outputs). Later, they wrote two more papers in 1979 and 1981 in which a generalized 
DEA in a multiple-output/multiple-input framework. In those papers, they argued that the 
imposition of a CRS structure for production technology implicitly assumes that producing units 
operate on optimal scales. As different firms operate in different market structures, with different 
externalities and financial restrictions, therefore this kind of model is always not always 
applicable in every situation. For that reason, in relaxing the CRS assumption the variable returns 





the BCC model, which can decompose technical inefficiency and scale inefficiency by defining 
and estimating the former at a given scale of operation under the assumption of a unique 
optimum (Maindiratta, 1990).  
Meta Frontier Analysis  
In general frontier analysis, it is assumed that all the observed units have identical 
technology. This may not always be realistic, as different units may have access to different 
production technologies. A variety of geographical, institutional, or other factors may give rise to 
such a situation. Construction of a general frontier for all units may give an inaccurate estimation 
of the efficiency of a unit. A way to address this problem of non-availability of all techniques to 
all firms is meta frontier analysis as proposed in Battese and Rao (2002) and Battese, Rao, and 
O’Donnell (2004). In this analysis, one constructs separate production possibility sets (and hence 
separate production frontiers) for separate groups of firms, with each such set being defined on 
the basis of observations on inputs and outputs of the firms belonging to the group in question, 
which is then used to measure a firm's within-group technical efficiency. In meta vs. group 
frontier analysis, the firms are first classified into different regions/groups based on certain 
criteria and the group-specific frontiers are constructed to estimate the efficiency of the firms 
against the group frontier. Further, a global or grand frontier which is indicated as a meta frontier 
is also constructed by considering all firms in the sample; the efficiency of the firm is also 
calculated against the grand frontier.  
When we face heterogeneities in technologies used by sub-groups of decision-making 
units (DMUs), we can expect the existence of different operational technologies within these 
groups. This necessitates that we compare the performance of each DMU within its respective 
group using a group-specific technology. Therefore, we compare the performance of DMUs with 





to the industry level technology (meta frontier). The meta frontier, which is called a grand 
frontier, is the envelope of all the group frontiers. This can be illustrated using the diagram given 
below (Figure 1). We can see that the meta frontier MM‘ is an envelope of the three group 
frontiers: g1g1‘, g2g2‘, and g3g3‘. The estimate of the gap between group frontier and meta 
frontier can help us identity the gap between the technologies used within a specific group and 
the technology used in the entire industry.  
Figure 1. Meta-Technology and Group Technology 
 
The Meta Frontier  
Let y and x be real output and input vectors of the dimension (C X 1) and (D X 1), 
respectively. The meta-technology set contains all input-output combinations that are 
technologically feasible. Formally, we write 
    𝑇𝑇 = {(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦): 𝑥𝑥 ≥ 0;𝑦𝑦 ≥ 0; 𝑥𝑥 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑦𝑦} 
With this meta-technology, we have a set of input and output sets. The output set can be 
defined for any input vector x as: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥) = {𝑦𝑦: (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) ∈ 𝑇𝑇} 


















The Group Frontiers 
Some of the DMUs face different sub-technologies which lead to different production 
possibilities for them. We can divide all DMUs into G groups (G > 1). The different 
environmental constraints may hinder the DMUs choice from all the technology feasible input-
output combinations in the meta-technology set T. We, therefore, have a different group-specific 
technology set available to DMUs in the gth group represented by:  
𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 = {(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦): 𝑥𝑥 ≥ 0: 𝑦𝑦 ≥ 0; 𝑥𝑥 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑦 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑢 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑔𝑔 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦} 
 
This g group specific technology can be represented by the following output sets: 
𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥) = {𝑦𝑦: (𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) ∈ 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔},𝑔𝑔 = 1, 2, 3 … .𝐺𝐺. 
The boundaries of the group specific output sets are called group frontiers. Figure 1 
above gives a visual representation of these sets. 
Estimation of Technical Efficiency 
In this section, we describe the estimation technique applied to measure the technical 
efficiency score of a firm. The assumptions are (a) all the observed input output bundles are 
feasible; (b) the production possibility set is convex, implying that given a set of N feasible input-
output bundles, any weighted average of these N input bundles can produce the same weighted 
average of the corresponding N output bundles; and (c) any input or output is freely disposable. 
The DEA attempts to generate the production frontier from the observed data without making 
any specific assumption regarding the functional form of the production function.  
Suppose there are 𝑁𝑁 firms in the system and we consider the 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ firm. The input output 
bundle of that firm is: 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = (𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡 , 𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡 , . . . , 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) and 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = (𝑦𝑦1𝑡𝑡 ,𝑦𝑦2𝑡𝑡 , . . . , 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡). To obtain the value of 
total inputs used and total outputs generated by a firm, one needs appropriate virtual prices 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
and 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 for inputs and outputs respectively. The total value of inputs used by the 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ firm would 









To give virtual prices the status of shadow prices, one needs to implicitly assume a 
perfectly competitive market structure, leaving no scope for supernormal profit. Hence, the 
production relation must satisfy the constraint stated as ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ≤ ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 ∀𝑡𝑡 along with 
non-negativity restriction on shadow prices. So, the intended programming problem would be:  




 Subject to: ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ≤ ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  and ∀𝑡𝑡 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑁𝑁 and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0 
Two problems may immediately be recognized with respect to this formulation. Firstly, 
by virtue of the profit constraint the objective function would be a fraction. Moreover, the system 
is homogeneous of degree zero in prices and therefore, if 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′𝑢𝑢and 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡′𝑢𝑢qualify as shadow prices, 
so would be 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡’s and 𝜆𝜆𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡’s. To handle both these problems simultaneously, a price 
normalization constraint can be incorporated which will change the programming problem as:  
Model 2: Max: ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  
Subject to: ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≤ 1𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  ∀𝑡𝑡 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑁𝑁 and 
         ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 , 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ,𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0 ∀𝑡𝑡 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑁𝑁 
This is a standard Linear Programming Problem and here 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 and 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡with 
λ > 0. Since the constraints apply to every firm including firm t, the maximum value of the 
objective function would be APt = 1 (Raa, 2009).  
Therefore, the dual of Model 2 will be: 
Model 3: Min: 𝜃𝜃 
Subject to: ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡=1 ≥ 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡;∀𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑚𝑚 and ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡=1 ≤ 𝜃𝜃𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡;∀𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑐𝑐    
                              and 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0;∀𝑡𝑡 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑁𝑁 
Where: 𝜃𝜃 is free. 





inefficiency score of 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ firm under CRS assumption. Again, if we define 𝜑𝜑 = 1
𝜃𝜃




minimization of 𝜃𝜃 is equivalent with maximization of𝜑𝜑. In term of redefined variables, the LP 
problem (Model 3) now becomes 
Model 4: Max: 𝜑𝜑 
Subject to: ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡=1 ≥ 𝜑𝜑𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡;∀𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑚𝑚 and ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡=1 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡;∀𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑐𝑐 
                  and𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0;∀𝑡𝑡 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑁𝑁 
Where: 𝜑𝜑 is free. 
The score generated from the expression 1
𝜑𝜑
 is nothing but the output oriented technical 
efficiency of the 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ firm under CRS. These two models consist of the first-generation model of 
efficiency score measurement known as CCR model. The (in)efficiency measurement with 
additional constraint ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡=1 = 1 in Model 3 and ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡=1 = 1 in Model 4 express extended 
version of CCR model known as BCC model which considers the VRS assumption instead of 
CRS assumption.  
In this paper, we modify the standard model for output-oriented TE (Model 4) by 
replacing the assumption of ‘free disposability of all outputs’ to ‘free disposability of good 
output and weak disposability of bad output’. Therefore, specifically in this paper, the model 
which is finally considered is  





Subject to: ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡=1 ≥ 𝜑𝜑
~
𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡;∀𝑗𝑗 Good Outputs and  
      ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡=1 = 𝛼𝛼𝜑𝜑
~
𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡;∀𝑘𝑘 Bad Outputs and 
                  ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡=1 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡;∀𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑐𝑐∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡=1 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡;∀𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑐𝑐 and   
                              ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡=1 = 1 and 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0;∀𝑡𝑡 = 1,2, . . ,𝑁𝑁 
Where: 𝜑𝜑
~
 is free & 0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 1 
The score generated from the expression 1
𝜑𝜑
~ is nothing but the output oriented technical 
efficiency of the 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ firm under VRS. We finally solve the model putting 𝛼𝛼 = 1, as it can be 





We repeat the process of estimation twice applying Model 5: once with state data of all 
analyzed countries together (generating efficiencies for the grand component) and once with 
states of a particular country separately (generating efficiencies for the group component). 
Variables and Data 
 
To estimate the technical efficiency, here three inputs and two outputs are taken. The total 
numbers of doctors, paramedics, and hospital beds are considered as inputs. The total number of 
recoveries is considered the good output and total number of deaths is considered the bad output. 
The data on these input-output variables are collected at the state level5 for three countries (India, 
Mexico, and the USA). Accordingly, 31 states are taken from India, 32 states from Mexico and 
50 states from the USA for our dataset.6 The summary statistics for output are given in Table 1. 
The summary statistics of inputs are given in Table 2.7 We have collated data from different 
sources for different classes of data. Also, we have considered three dates, viz. until August 27, 
2020, until October 2, 2020 and until November 29, 2020, to collect the data.  
For the two outcome variables for measuring the performances of the states/regions in 
COVID-19 management: cumulative deaths and recoveries at the end of each of the three dates 
mentioned above, the data for Indian states have been taken from the Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare website where data for active cases, deaths, and discharged patients are provided 
and updated regularly. US state-level COVID-19 data is collected from the Worldometer website. 
The data for Mexico is taken from the Johns Hopkins University real time data website. 
 
5 In our paper, each state is considered as a decision-making unit (DMU) in case of COVID-19 pandemic management.  
6 Note that Washington, D.C., is excluded despite being a federal district (state equivalent) due to lack of data. In India, we have 
taken the major states and not the special category states, as the special category states have different fiscal arrangements with the 
central government; this is a standard practice for Indian states. 
7 Here, in our efficiency estimation model, for three time periods the values of all inputs in the input set are same. Only the values of 






We have used the number of doctors, paramedics, and hospital beds to measure the 
preparedness of the states in managing COVID-19 pandemic. The data for number of doctors and 
paramedics are collected from the occupational employment statistics of BLS (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics) for the USA, while the same is collected from the National Health Profile 2019 (14th 
issue) for India. The number of hospital beds is collected from the AHA annual survey (2018) for 
the USA and from Kapoor et al. (2020) for India. In Mexico, private sector health statistics are 
collected from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) website and the public 
sector health indicators are collected from the Government of Mexico (Gobierno de México) 
website. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Status of Outputs (COVID-19 Deaths and Recoveries) 
 
  AUG-27-2020 OCT-03-2020 NOV-29-2020 
Statistics Recovery Death Recovery Death Recovery Death 
IND 
Obs. 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Mean 83,098 1,981 1,77,085 3,274 2,82,944 4,395 
Median 43,757 448 1,11,712 912 1,87,969 1,680 
SD 1,19,866 4,362 2,44,030 6,937 3,58,503 8,620 
Skewness 2 4 2 4 2 4 
Kurtosis 8 20 9 21 9 21 
Min. 500 0 1,772 0 3,425 5 
Max. 5,31,563 23,444 11,34,555 37,758 16,76,564 46,986 
MEX 
Obs. 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Mean 10,250 1,890 19,937 2,465 25,414 3,296 
Median 8,428 1,233 15,174 1,697 18,144 2,488 
SD 11,211 2,065 20,917 2,487 28,708 3,272 
Skewness 3 3 3 3 4 3 
Kurtosis 13 11 12 10 17 10 
Min. 1,321 313 4,028 485 4,362 667 
Max. 59,545 10,159 1,08,944 12,252 1,61,039 15,588 
USA 
Obs. 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Mean 64,873 3,607 93,907 4,158 1,56,836 5,304 
Median 33,328 1,642 51,864 2,099 87,248 3,145 
SD 95,596 5,673 1,30,441 6,035 1,89,010 6,769 
Skewness 3 3 3 3 2 2 
Kurtosis 12 16 11 12 10 9 





Max. 4,95,569 32,794 6,95,684 32,994 9,87,717 34,512 
ALL 
Obs. 113 113 113 113 113 113 
Mean 54,404 2,675 95,779 3,436 1,54,215 4,486 
Median 14,632 1,084 29,527 1,530 51,333 2,376 
SD 93,356 4,589 1,64,289 5,572 2,44,159 6,604 
Skewness 3 4 4 4 3 4 
Kurtosis 14 22 19 21 17 20 
Min. 500 0 1,622 0 2,494 5 






Table 2: Summary Statistics of Input Variables (Doctors, Paramedics, and Hospital Beds) 
 











Obs. 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Mean 35770 0.001 203069 0.005 60958 0.002 
Median 15038 0.001 88462 0.005 26496 0.002 
SD  45273 0.001 233342 0.004 77048 0.001 
Skewness 1 0.699 1 1.243 2 0.674 
Kurtosis 4 2.442 3 5.229 5 2.778 
Min. 74 0.000 922 0.000 1790 0.000 
Max. 173384 0.002 706732 0.018 281402 0.004 
MEX 
Obs. 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Mean 8262 0.002 11317 0.003 3850 0.001 
Median 6550 0.002 9010 0.003 2862 0.001 
SD  7910 0.001 10559 0.001 3969 0.000 
Skewness 2 3.088 3 3.056 3 3.048 
Kurtosis 6 13.407 11 15.028 11 15.280 
Min. 1823 0.001 2540 0.002 804 0.001 
Max. 33973 0.005 54902 0.006 20363 0.002 
USA 
Obs. 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Mean 18030 0.003 5199 0.001 16248 0.003 
Median 11899 0.003 3790 0.001 12060 0.003 
SD  20836 0.001 5064 0.000 16469 0.001 
Skewness 2 0.994 2 0.284 2 0.845 
Kurtosis 10 3.805 5 2.383 6 3.729 
Min. 1201 0.002 560 0.000 1617 0.002 








Stage 2: Exploratory Nonparametric Median Group Classification Analysis 
 
In this stage, we analyze the variations of the 113 grand technical efficiency scores (state 
level) with respect to some state finance related factors and with some sociodemographic and 
development indicators. Using these variables as explanatory factors, we apply an Exploratory 
Nonparametric Median Group Classification Analysis8 to explore the variation of grand TE 
scores. After that, the same technique has also been applied to analyze the variation of country 
specific Group Technical Efficiency Scores (state level) for India, Mexico, and the USA 
separately.  
First, for each explanatory variable, we calculate the median. Then, for each explanatory 
variable, we classify the technical efficiency scores between two groups. Explanatory variables 
values are sorted into these two groups for each explanatory variable, denoted as Lower than 
Median Group (LMG) and Higher than Median Group (HMG), according to the variable’s 
median value. After that, we calculate the average of the TE scores of the two groups (LMG and 
HMG) for each explanatory variable. Then we compare the values of the calculated means (of 
the TE Scores) between the two groups for each explanatory variable. Finally, we explore and 
thoroughly analyze the change of average TE scores of the two groups for each explanatory 
variable. We seek patterns of relationships with the variables explaining efficiencies, comparing 
the results of the three time periods mentioned above. If the same monotonic ‘increase-increase-
increase’ or ‘decrease-decrease-decrease’ pattern comprising the three time periods appears, that 
indicates that the variable has a clear role in explaining variations in efficiency. 
 
 
8 We also tested the standard Confirmatory Parametric Methods (like OLS and Probit/Tobit Regression) to find out the exact causes of the variation 





Variables and Data 
 
The variations in the efficiency scores for the grand frontier have been explained by 31 
variables. The variation of group TE scores has also been explained with respect to additional 
variables subject to their availability. All the financial variables are expressed in USD. Table 3 
lists these variables. 
For the USA, the state finance data are collected from the US Census Bureau. The data 
for India are taken from the Subnational Finance Budget Report published by the Reserve Bank 
of India. In Mexico, the state finance data are taken from National Institute of Statistics and 
Geography (INEGI). We use total revenue, own revenue, total expenditure, health expenditure, 
hospital expenditure, and public debt data to indicate fiscal health at the state level. 
The state level gross domestic product data is collected from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis in the USA, the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI) in 
India, and INEGI in Mexico. Each country defines its calamity relief fund (or parallel concept) 
somewhat differently. Accordingly, we recognized rainy-day fund (also known as budget 
stabilization fund) data as a proxy for calamity relief in the USA. A rainy-day fund allows a state 
to set aside surplus revenue for use during unexpected deficits. The data are taken from the Pew 
Charitable Trusts. For India, we use the disaster management fund data from the 15th Finance 
Commission Report. In Mexico, we use the Natural Disaster Fund (FONDEN) data taken from 
Buhler (2018).  
Another indicator to gauge efficiency is state level governance indicators. For USA, state 
level governance indicators are not readily available, so, we used budget efficiency indicators as 
a proxy for governance. For India, we used state level governance indicators provided by Public 





Project’s Mexico States Rule of Law Index 2018. The data for the percentages of population over 
65 years of age, working, and literate are from the US Census Bureau, BLS, and World 
Population Review, respectively, for the USA. For India, the same has been collected from 
projections on Census 2011 data. For Mexico, the population and working population data is 
taken from National Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOI 2017) and the literacy rate is 
taken from INEGI. Although data from different years are used for these indicators, we believe 
such percentages change slowly over time and thus should not bias our results. 
Table 3: Variables Used in Stage 2 to Explain Variations in Efficiency Scores in Stage 19 
 













1 Per Capita Own Revenue pc_own_rev 
2 Per Capita Total Revenue pc_tot_rev 
3 Per Capita Total Expenditure pc_tot_exp 
4 Per Capita Health Expenditure pc_health_exp 
5 Per Capita GSDP pc_gsdp 
6 Perc. of Health Expenditure Over Total Expenditure percent_health_exp_total 
7 Percentage of Health Expenditure Over GSDP percent_health_exp_gsdp 
8 Fiscal Health w.r.t. Own Revenue fiscal_health_own 
9 Fiscal Health w.r.t. Total Revenue fiscal_health_tot 
10 Per Capita Transfer pc_transfer 
11 Population Density pop_density 
12 Percentage of Own Revenue w.r.t. Total Revenue percent_own_tot_rev 
13 Percentage of Transfer w.r.t. Total Revenue percent_trans_tot_rev 
14 Percentage of Calamity Relief w.r.t. Own Revenue perctnt_calamity_relief_own_rev 
15 Percentage of Calamity Relief w.r.t. Total Revenue percent_calamity_relief_tot_rev 
16 Perc. of Calamity Relief w.r.t. Total Expenditure percent_calamity_relief_tot_exp 
17 Percentage of Calamity Relief w.r.t. GSDP percent_calamity_relief_gsdp 
18 Per Capita Calamity Relief pc_calamity_relief 
19 Literacy Rate literacy_rate 
20 Working Proportion of Population working_prop 
21 Human Development Index Hdi 
22 Health Index health_index 
23 Education Index education_index 
24 Income Index income_index 
25 Normalized Governance Index n_governance 
26 Normalized Equity Indicator n_equity 
 





27 Percentage of Debt w.r.t. Own Revenue percent_debt_own_rev 
28 Percentage of Debt w.r.t. Total Revenue percent_debt_tot_rev 
29 Percentage of Debt w.r.t. Total Expenditure percent_debt_tot_exp 
30 Percentage of Debt w.r.t. GSDP percent_debt_gsdp 
31 Per Capita Debt pc_debt 









 1 Governance Index Governance 
2 Per Capita Education expenditure pc_education_exp 
3 Per Capita Infrastructure expenditure pc_infra_exp 
4 Per Capita Social Sector Expenditure pc_socsec_exp 
5 Per Capita Revenue Expenditure pc_revenue_exp 
6 Per Capita Capital Expenditure pc_capital_exp 
7 Population Over 65 Years pop_over65 
8 Percentage of Precondition precondition_percent 
 
3. Results & Observations 
 
Stage 1 
We find that the overall grand efficiency in COVID-19 pandemic management increased 
from 63% to 71% from 27th August to 3rd October, 2020. It reached 74% on 29th November, 2020 
(Table 4). This indicates that experience plays a role in managing the pandemic. 
Table 4: Summary Statistics of Grand & Group Efficiency for Three Periods 
 
AUG-27-2020 
  Obs. Mean Median SD Skewness Kurtosis Min. Max. 
IND Grand 31 0.59 0.59 0.35 -0.07 1.43 0.04 1.00 Group 31 0.74 1.00 0.33 -0.71 1.87 0.08 1.00 
MEX Grand 32 0.63 0.56 0.28 0.20 1.41 0.28 1.00 Group 32 0.73 0.81 0.27 -0.34 1.48 0.28 1.00 
USA Grand 50 0.65 0.67 0.29 -0.20 1.76 0.13 1.00 Group 50 0.66 0.67 0.29 -0.20 1.76 0.13 1.00 
ALL Grand 113 0.63 0.64 0.30 -0.10 1.62 0.04 1.00 
OCT-03-2020 
  Obs. Mean Median SD Skewness Kurtosis Min. Max. 
IND Grand 31 0.72 0.89 0.32 -0.60 1.71 0.13 1.00 Group 31 0.79 1.00 0.30 -0.91 2.18 0.16 1.00 
MEX Grand 32 0.70 0.64 0.24 0.00 1.60 0.30 1.00 Group 32 0.77 0.84 0.24 -0.48 1.69 0.30 1.00 
USA Grand 50 0.72 0.82 0.29 -0.58 1.91 0.15 1.00 Group 50 0.73 0.84 0.29 -0.59 1.89 0.15 1.00 






  Obs. Mean Median SD Skewness Kurtosis Min. Max. 
IND Grand 31 0.71 0.85 0.31 -0.44 1.60 0.13 1.00 Group 31 0.82 1.00 0.27 -1.15 2.78 0.21 1.00 
MEX Grand 32 0.76 0.73 0.20 -0.36 2.37 0.29 1.00 Group 32 0.81 0.88 0.19 -0.82 2.81 0.29 1.00 
USA Grand 50 0.75 0.83 0.27 -0.88 2.52 0.14 1.00 Group 50 0.76 0.87 0.26 -0.88 2.41 0.17 1.00 
ALL Grand 113 0.74 0.81 0.26 -0.71 2.31 0.13 1.00 
 
In the case of India, the average grand efficiency score was 59% on 27th August, 2020 
which was below the grand average. In the initial and final time periods taken for the study, 
India’s average efficiency was lower than the grand average for the three countries. The results 
reflect that the USA was holding the leading position in terms of overall COVID-19 pandemic 
management at that time. For these two periods, the scores of Mexico were 70% & 76% and the 
scores of the USA were 72% and 75%. It is noted that the grand efficiency score of USA was 
always higher than the overall grand average for all the three periods.   
If we compare the averages of Country Specific Group Efficiency scores the efficiency 
level of India and Mexico were almost same (74% and 73%) for 27th August, 2020. However, in 
the case of the USA, the average group efficiency level is almost same with its grand efficiency 
level (66%) on that time. This indicates that the states of the USA were performing consistently 
well with respect to their own country as well as other countries.  
However, if we compare the grand and group efficiency scores of all three countries, we 
find that the states of India and Mexico were performing well in their own countries but doing 
worse than American states in terms of the global scenario on 27th August. Again, it has been 
noted that, for all these three countries (India, Mexico, and the USA), the Country Specific 
Group Efficiency scores gradually increased on 3rd October (79%, 77%, and 73%, respectively) 





also find the states of India always perform better within the country than the states of other two 
countries. One plausible explanation of the better performance of India in terms of group 
efficiency could be the favorable recovery and fatality rates in the country. 
Stage 2 
 
Median Analysis: Grand Efficiency Score 
 
Next, we use median analysis to recognize the association of efficiency scores generated 
in Stage 1 with the state finance and other demographic and socioeconomic variables. We 
identify the patterns of behavior of the variable concerned to explain the variations in efficiency 
with time. For example, when we find that the variable concerned has showed a pattern that, 
when moving from the LMG for HMG groups for the variable, the corresponding average 
efficiencies values have increased in all three time periods, we note that as ‘increase-increase-
increase’ pattern. Likewise, we can have patterns like ‘decrease-decrease-decrease’, ‘increase-
decrease-increase’, and so forth. We tabulate monotone patterns like ‘increase-increase-increase’ 
and ‘decrease-decrease-decrease’ for the following discussions as they can be interpreted as 
smooth directions in movement of grand average efficiency scores with the variable of reference 
in Table 5. 
For all three time periods, the state finance variables, such as per capita own revenue, per 
capita total revenue, per capita total expenditure, per capita health expenditure, and per capita 
transfer, are positively associated with average grand efficiency scores (reflected in an ‘increase-
increase-increase pattern). Debt to total revenue or total expenditure ratio have a negative 
association (reflected through a decrease-decrease-decrease pattern) with average grand 
efficiency scores in all time periods. This clearly indicates that the state finances can play a role 





positively associated with average grand efficiency scores.  
Among demographic variables, population density is negatively associated with average 
grand efficiency scores for August and November but shows a slight positive association in the 
early October data. The inconsistency can be explained by the two-way reasoning: firstly, higher 
population density is detrimental for preventing COVID-19 spread; thus, a negative association 
is not surprising. On the other hand, states with higher population density most likely contain 
more urban areas and are richer compared to low density states and thus may have the means to 
manage COVID better. 
The percentage of working population has a positive role to play in all three time periods, 
but literacy rate does not have any consistent association with the average grand efficiency 
scores. The human development, health, and education indices are positively associated with 
average grand efficiency scores, but we do not find any consistent association of the income 
index with the same. Contrary to our expectation, the governance indicators have a negative 
association with average grand efficiency scores. This result may follow from the intuition that 
states with larger urban areas and higher population density may also have better governance 
indicators and, due to rapid spread of the virus, are less efficient in managing COVID.  
Table 5: Median Analysis: Patterns in the Determinants of Grand Efficiency 
Monotone Patterns in Median Analysis Variables 
increase-increase-increase 
Per Capita Own Revenue 
Per Capita Total Revenue 
Per Capita Total Expenditure 
Per Capita Health Expenditure 
Per Capita GSDP 
Per Capita Transfer 
Percentage of Own Revenue w.r.t. Total Revenue 
Percentage of Calamity Relief w.r.t. Own Revenue 
Perc. of Calamity Relief w.r.t. Total Expenditure 
Per Capita Calamity Relief 






Median Analysis: Group Efficiency Score 
 
We also take the countries separately to see if there is any inherent difference in the 
association of indicators and group efficiency scores amongst different countries in different time 
periods (Table 6). For India, we find the relationships between group efficiency scores and state 
finance, socioeconomic, and demographic indicators to be similar to that of the grand efficiency 
scores in late August. In early October, the association of group efficiency scores with per capita 
own revenue and per capita GSDP reversed and became negative for unknown reasons, then 
reverted to its original positive association in late November. Population density is positively 
associated for all three time periods. Given the rural-urban divide in India, it is not surprising that 
states with bigger urban areas/more urban agglomeration are also the richer states able to handle 










Perc. of Health Expenditure Over Total Expenditure 
Percentage of Health Expenditure Over GSDP 
Fiscal Health w.r.t. Own Revenue 
Fiscal Health w.r.t. Total Revenue 
Percentage of Transfer w.r.t. Total Revenue 
Percentage of Debt w.r.t. Own Revenue 
Percentage of Debt w.r.t. Total Revenue 
Percentage of Debt w.r.t. Total Expenditure 
Percentage of Debt w.r.t. GSDP 
Normanize Governance Index 





Table 6: Median Analysis: Patterns in the Determinants of Group Efficiency Scores 
 
Monotone 




Per Capita Total Revenue Per Capita Total Revenue Per Capita Total Revenue 
Per Capita Total 
Expenditure   
Per Capita Total 
Expenditure 
  Per Capita GSDP Per Capita GSDP 
  
Percentage of Own 
Revenue w.r.t. Total 
Revenue 
Percentage of Own 
Revenue w.r.t. Total 
Revenue 
Literacy Rate   Literacy Rate 
Working Proportion of 
Population   
Working Proportion of 
Population 
Human Development 
Index   
Human Development 
Index 
Health Index   Health Index 
Education Index   Education Index 
Percentage of Calamity 
Relief w.r.t. Total 
Revenue 
Percentage of Calamity 
Relief w.r.t. Total 
Revenue 
Percentage of Calamity 




decrease   
Percentage of Calamity 
Relief w.r.t. Total 
Expenditure 
Percentage of Calamity 
Relief w.r.t. Total 
Expenditure 
Percentage of Calamity 
Relief w.r.t. GSDP   
Percentage of Calamity 
Relief w.r.t. GSDP 
Percentage of Debt w.r.t. 
Own Revenue 
Percentage of Debt w.r.t. 
Own Revenue   
Percentage of Debt w.r.t. 
Total Revenue 
Percentage of Debt w.r.t. 
Total Revenue   
Percentage of Debt w.r.t. 
Total Expenditure 
Percentage of Debt w.r.t. 
Total Expenditure   
Percentage of Debt w.r.t. 
GSDP   
Percentage of Debt w.r.t. 
GSDP 
  Population Density Population Density 
 
For Mexico, in late August, per capita health expenditure did not have a role to play in 
explaining group efficiency scores. Per capita transfer and per capita calamity relief was 
negatively associated with group efficiency scores. Higher per capita transfer may be associated 
with worse fiscal health and may affect COVID management efficiency adversely. On the other 





are more earthquake and storm prone), so higher per capita calamity relief fund may indicate 
worse socioeconomic conditions and infrastructure and thus worse COVID management 
capacity. The only change from late August to early October is that the per capita revenue 
reversed to a negative association with group efficiency scores, which reverted to a positive 
association again in late November data. Per capita transfer had an inconsistent relationship 
among the time periods. In late November, the governance indicator had a positive association 
with group efficiency scores. Unlike India, population density is negatively associated with 
group efficiency scores for all three time periods. 
In USA, per capita health expenditure has a negative association with group in all time 
periods. There have been many inconsistencies in the nature of association of indicator and group 
efficiency scores among different time periods. 
4. Conclusions 
The paper attempts to establish the importance of subnational finances in COVID-19 
management. Taking a sample of three of the worst affected countries, the USA, India, and 
Mexico, it first assesses the performances of the countries in managing the pandemic, both at the 
global and local levels. Second, it attempts to explore the roles of state finances, demographic 
factors, and socioeconomic factors in explaining state performances in COVID management. 
While the USA performs better than the other two countries as a whole, its efficiency scores are 
not that high. The exploratory analysis in the second stage indicates clearly that state finances 
have a role to play and can act as a catalyst in boosting the performances of all countries studied. 
This invites further study on the important policy implications of dividing the load of disaster 
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Table A1: Summary Statistics of Second Stage Variables for India 
 
Sl. No. Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
01 pc_own_rev 31 0.20 0.14 0.04 0.76 
02 pc_tot_rev 31 0.53 0.37 0.19 1.84 
03 pc_tot_exp 31 0.66 0.43 0.22 2.00 
04 pc_health_exp 31 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.13 
05 pc_gsdp 31 2.64 1.51 0.65 7.11 
06 percent_health_exp_total 31 4.97 1.61 3.21 11.52 
07 percent_health_exp_gsdp 31 1.46 1.12 0.54 5.72 
08 fiscal_health_own 31 428.96 351.97 128.32 1,323.87 
09 fiscal_health_tot 31 126.59 10.39 108.74 143.24 
10 pc_transfer 31 0.33 0.36 0.05 1.65 
11 pop_density 31 884.53 2,243.62 18.75 12,616.94 
12 percent_own_tot_rev 31 44.73 22.84 8.84 87.12 
13 percent_trans_tot_rev 31 55.27 22.84 12.88 91.16 
14 perctnt_calamity_relief_own_rev 31 3.14 2.54 0.18 13.73 
15 percent_calamity_relief_tot_rev 31 1.08 0.77 0.13 3.85 
16 percent_calamity_relief_tot_exp 31 0.88 0.67 0.09 3.44 
17 percent_calamity_relief_gsdp 31 0.22 0.20 0.02 1.13 
18 pc_calamity_relief 31 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 
19 literacy_rate 31 85.81 5.14 75.10 97.60 
20 working_prop 31 0.41 0.05 0.33 0.52 
21 hdi 31 0.67 0.05 0.58 0.78 
22 health_index 31 0.78 0.03 0.70 0.86 
23 education_index 31 0.59 0.06 0.48 0.73 
24 income_index 31 0.67 0.07 0.53 0.77 
25 n_governance 31 0.00 0.60 -1.21 1.10 
26 n_equity 31 0.00 0.98 -2.29 1.89 
27 percent_debt_own_rev 31 68.48 57.46 0.00 295.04 
28 percent_debt_tot_rev 31 23.05 14.35 0.00 74.36 
29 percent_debt_tot_exp 31 17.74 10.13 0.00 54.22 
30 percent_debt_gsdp 31 4.67 3.06 0.00 15.76 
31 pc_debt 31 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.26 
32 governance 31 0.00 0.60 -1.21 1.10 
33 pc_education_exp 31 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.25 
34 pc_infra_exp 31 0.43 0.31 0.16 1.49 
35 pc_socsec_exp 31 0.26 0.16 0.10 0.69 
36 pc_revenue_exp 31 0.50 0.29 0.17 1.26 
37 pc_capital_exp 31 0.16 0.15 0.05 0.74 
38 pop_over65 31 5.22 1.24 2.76 8.32 






Table A2: Summary Statistics of Second Stage Variables for Mexico 
 
Sl. No. Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
01 pc_own_rev 32 0.17 0.13 0.05 0.73 
02 pc_tot_rev 32 0.98 0.20 0.41 1.53 
03 pc_tot_exp 32 0.98 0.20 0.40 1.53 
04 pc_health_exp 32 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.43 
05 pc_gsdp 32 9.65 5.31 3.12 29.53 
06 percent_health_exp_total 32 15.84 17.21 4.49 107.19 
07 percent_health_exp_gsdp 32 1.49 0.35 0.53 2.14 
08 fiscal_health_own 32 787.31 373.11 208.64 1,646.59 
09 fiscal_health_tot 32 99.90 0.55 96.88 100.00 
10 pc_transfer 32 0.81 0.15 0.35 1.19 
11 pop_density 32 300.98 1,024.92 11.77 5,851.76 
12 percent_own_tot_rev 32 16.26 9.38 6.07 47.93 
13 percent_trans_tot_rev 32 83.74 9.38 52.07 93.93 
14 perctnt_calamity_relief_own_rev 32 10.56 10.55 0.03 39.18 
15 percent_calamity_relief_tot_rev 32 1.35 1.22 0.01 4.44 
16 percent_calamity_relief_tot_exp 32 1.35 1.22 0.01 4.44 
17 percent_calamity_relief_gsdp 32 0.20 0.26 0.00 1.05 
18 pc_calamity_relief 32 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 
19 literacy_rate 32 93.74 3.66 84.20 97.70 
20 working_prop 32 0.44 0.03 0.37 0.50 
21 hdi 32 0.77 0.03 0.69 0.83 
22 health_index 32 0.85 0.01 0.82 0.87 
23 education_index 32 0.69 0.05 0.58 0.83 
24 income_index 32 0.77 0.04 0.68 0.81 
25 n_governance 32 0.00 1.00 -3.00 1.70 
26 n_equity 32 0.00 1.00 -3.00 1.70 
27 percent_debt_own_rev 32 36.12 25.14 0.00 97.39 
28 percent_debt_tot_rev 32 6.61 6.92 0.00 31.61 
29 percent_debt_tot_exp 32 6.62 6.93 0.00 31.61 
30 percent_debt_gsdp 32 0.84 0.99 0.00 3.78 
31 pc_debt 32 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.48 
32 governance 32 0.39 0.03 0.29 0.45 
33 pc_education_exp NA NA NA NA NA 
34 pc_infra_exp NA NA NA NA NA 
35 pc_socsec_exp NA NA NA NA NA 
36 pc_revenue_exp NA NA NA NA NA 
37 pc_capital_exp NA NA NA NA NA 
38 pop_over65 32 44.07 2.81 37.30 49.91 









Table A3: Summary Statistics of Second Stage Variables for USA 
 
Sl. No. Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
01 pc_own_rev 50 6.11 1.54 3.49 9.32 
02 pc_tot_rev 50 8.35 1.99 5.08 13.63 
03 pc_tot_exp 50 7.67 2.11 4.46 16.46 
04 pc_health_exp 50 0.19 0.12 0.05 0.59 
05 pc_gsdp 50 58.65 11.21 38.65 86.13 
06 percent_health_exp_total 50 2.36 1.26 0.65 5.59 
07 percent_health_exp_gsdp 50 0.31 0.19 0.11 1.10 
08 fiscal_health_own 50 126.35 16.77 93.66 185.38 
09 fiscal_health_tot 50 91.68 7.29 77.35 120.77 
10 pc_transfer 50 2.23 0.70 1.28 4.75 
11 pop_density 50 66.13 80.32 0.42 393.00 
12 percent_own_tot_rev 50 73.13 5.20 63.40 82.59 
13 percent_trans_tot_rev 50 26.87 5.20 17.41 36.60 
14 perctnt_calamity_relief_own_rev 50 4.72 6.58 0.00 35.41 
15 percent_calamity_relief_tot_rev 50 3.37 4.40 0.00 23.07 
16 percent_calamity_relief_tot_exp 50 3.65 4.60 0.00 27.02 
17 percent_calamity_relief_gsdp 50 0.53 0.83 0.00 4.26 
18 pc_calamity_relief 50 0.33 0.59 0.00 3.14 
19 literacy_rate 50 88.36 4.31 77.00 94.00 
20 working_prop 50 0.62 0.05 0.52 0.71 
21 hdi 50 0.92 0.02 0.86 0.96 
22 health_index 50 0.90 0.03 0.85 0.94 
23 education_index 50 0.91 0.02 0.86 0.94 
24 income_index 50 0.95 0.03 0.89 1.00 
25 n_governance 50 0.00 1.00 -2.75 1.25 
26 n_equity 50 0.00 1.00 -2.75 1.25 
27 percent_debt_own_rev 50 60.45 30.68 16.19 152.84 
28 percent_debt_tot_rev 50 44.17 22.90 11.09 114.71 
29 percent_debt_tot_exp 50 47.99 24.91 13.49 143.52 
30 percent_debt_gsdp 50 6.30 3.21 1.66 15.01 
31 pc_debt 50 3.81 2.44 0.91 11.39 
32 governance 50 0.74 0.11 0.44 0.88 
33 pc_education_exp 50 2.25 0.57 1.32 4.62 
34 pc_infra_exp 50 1.08 0.48 0.44 3.35 
35 pc_socsec_exp 50 6.66 1.83 4.00 14.35 
36 pc_revenue_exp NA NA NA NA NA 
37 pc_capital_exp NA NA NA NA NA 
38 pop_over65 50 16.37 1.91 10.74 20.45 
39 precondition_percent 50 0.51 0.01 0.46 0.53 
 
 
